The comprehensive study of international experience is of utmost importance for the effective functioning of the democratic processes in the newly independent states in order, in the first place, to avoid possible mistakes and take into account approaches that have already become a common value, and in the second place, to reveal one's own peculiarities and bring them into conformity with common solutions.

The comparative analysis of the internationally accumulated experience of constitutional oversight, apart from the above mentioned reasons, is also conditioned by the fact that the corresponding European systems of constitutional oversight, in particular, that were established in the post-war period, currently undergo active reforms. Hence, the study of new solutions and the creation of reliable guarantees to ensure the Constitutional order acquire greater importance.

In this work the concept of constitutional oversight is interpreted and defined as a system. Special attention has been paid to the peculiarities of constitutional oversight in times of transition and reforms.

Constitutional oversight, as an important public and government function ensuring the dynamic development and inner stability of the society, is closely linked to the nature of the given public relations and to the basic principles and aims of the Constitution. Almost all states have tried to give a constitutional formulation of their social relations, defining the state as secular or dominated by the rule of law and democratic and/or social. The definition of the nature of public relations supposes also clarification of approaches and priorities and, based on these requirements, the composition of the whole structure of a state and the setting of the rhythm by which it functions. In this regard special importance has been attached in this work to the issues of bringing to light the nature of social relations, its constitutional definition, and its relations to constitutional oversight.

An attempt has been made to classify the phases of the development of the systems of constitutional oversight and to reveal their qualitative peculiarities.

In terms of chronology, the periods of 1803-1920, 1920-1940, 1945-1990 and that after 1990 are distinguished, and problems which are typical to these periods and which condition corresponding approaches to constitutional oversight have been analysed.

Peculiarities of the formation of the institutions of constitutional oversight, problems facing them, forms of constitutional oversight, objects and subjects of such oversight, the nature of court resolutions and several other questions have been studied on the factual materials concerning more than forty countries.

Institutions of constitutional oversight have been classified into three main groups. The first group comprises those bodies which (a) carry out the constitutional control (oversight) of laws and regulations, ( b) settle disputes between different bodies of state power regarding their authority and (c) carry out direct control in the sphere of human rights protection, based on appeals directly received from the citizens themselves.

The second group comprises institutions of constitutional oversight of those countries where these institutions are entitled only to functions (a) and (b).

The third group comprises only those specialized agencies of constitutional oversight which are entitled only to functions listed in point (a).

Peculiarities of the functioning of the bodies of constitutional oversight comprising each group, various aspects of their activities deserving special attention, as well as other aspects of their authority (particularly ensuring the conformity of the holding of referenda and elections, as well as the functioning of political parties with the Constitution, questions of impeachment, etc.) have been separately studied.

Special attention has been paid to the problems of providing guarantees for the independence of the institutions of constitutional oversight.

Special importance has been attached in this work to the analysis of the mechanisms of constitutional control of human rights protection in terms of the implanting of a reliable system of guarantees for the protection of human rights in the newly independent states.

The study has led to certain general conclusions, to the revealing of the main tendencies in the further development of the systems of constitutional oversight and to the understanding of the main lessons of the past. All these can be summarized in the following:

1. Objective prerequisites for the passage to a qualitatively new system of constitutional oversight were created in the beginning of the 20th century. This concerned, in the first place, the active qualitative reforms of social relations growing into structural transformations, as well as the creation of extreme situations in the public administrations of simultaneously several countries.

2. The problem of ensuring the conformity of law with the Constitution ceased to be a mere or predominantly a problem of human rights protection. The problem of ensuring that public stability and development are sustainable processes, as well as the guaranteeing of the active and mutually agreed participation of all bodies of state power, as well as that of citizens, came to the foreground.

3. The problem of the formation of the intra-state mechanisms for human rights protection acquired a new quality, and a special role was allocated to the specialized institutions of constitutional oversight.

4. In transitional and extreme situations the prevention of negative phenomena and the diminishing of probable damage, rather than the overcoming of consequences, acquire greater importance. In this regard the implanting of the system of preliminary control, which is incompatible with the American model of constitutional oversight, was extremely important.

5. The specialized system of constitutional oversight, especially for countries in transition, creates the utmost possibility of finding legal solutions to political disagreements. In fact a real possibility is created of finding legal, constitutional solutions to all situations that have reached a deadlock.

6. The resolution by the new systems of the problem of the conformity of laws with the Constitution introduced changes in methodology; it transferred the problem from a legal-practical level to the level of public administration.

7. The formation of specialized systems enabled the application of a comprehensive approach to the problem of guaranteeing the conformity of laws with the Constitution. Not only this contributed to the making of this question a subject of investigation at the stages of drafting, adoption and implementation of a law, but also to the establishment of wider democracy, to essential expansion of the list of subjects of constitutional oversight and parties who can appeal to the constitutional court for that purpose.

8. The specialized system of constitutional courts substantially increased the influence of constitutional oversight on the improvement of legislative system and also further improved constitutional settlements.

9. Larger possibilities were created to maintain the balance of the separation of powers and to apply the mechanism of checks and balances effectively. Of the factors substantially contributing to the solution of this problem should be singled out the practice of preliminary constitutional control of the regulations of both chambers of parliament, the rights of a parliamentary minority to constitutional oversight, the verification function of constitutional courts regarding the conformity of presidential elections and the functioning of political parties with the Constitution, as well as the possibility to settle disputes between various bodies of state power with the help of the institutions of constitutional oversight.

10.In many countries institutions of constitutional oversight are overburdened by powers not very typical of their function, which has often had a negative impact on the efficiency of their activities.

11. As an important conclusion it should be mentioned that a consistent and effective functioning of the institutions of constitutional oversight may be expected when and where a comprehensive approach to the formation of the system is applied, and when the areas of jurisdiction and real prerequisites of their implementation are fully defined and enshrined in the constitution. The approach in this case should not be conditioned by the political considerations of the moment, but should rather have at its basis the demands put forward by the methodology of structural management. Irrespective of the changes in the political situation the inviolability and independent functioning of the institution of constitutional oversight should be guaranteed. It is of particular importance in transition times, as it can be witnessed by the events in the Russian Federation an in Belarus. The solution of this problem also requires substantial improvement in the international cooperation of constitutional courts.

12. The realization that every society has written and unwritten rules for its existence, including those surviving from its pre-constitutional period, as well as an integral system of their maintenance and control(checks) over the authorities, is of utmost importance. Important constituents of that system have been faith (church), norms of moral behaviour, traditions (social, family), rules of behaviour that are conditioned by peculiarities of either a small or a large system, legal norms, etc. The problem is not the opposing of constitutional oversight to all these, but rather bringing them all into harmony. That means that in each country, taking into consideration its many peculiarities, all constituents should be identified and harmonized.

As for the main tendencies in the development of the systems of constitutional oversight, the following are underlined:

1. Special or specialized bodies of constitutional oversight become one of the exceptionally important institutions of state power, contributing to balance and stability, to the establishment and deepening of democracy, the enforcing of the rule of law, and the reinforcing of the immune system of the society.

2. The trend in already functioning systems is towards the improvement of the forms of organization; a clearer definition of powers; the improvement of principles, forms and methods of constitutional oversight; the enlarging of the list of subjects who can appeal to the court, the definition of the objects of control; and the raising of the role of preliminary control, etc.

It is necessary to emphasize that setting the proper balance of preliminary and later control, as well as the reasonable harmonization of obligatory and optional control are very important, and different countries continue their efforts to find rational solutions to this end.

3. The nature of resolutions adopted by institutions of constitutional oversight plays an exceptionally important role in deciding whether laws comply with the Constitution or not. Here approaches should differ depending on the kind of the legal regulation and the form of control, laying down an integral system of the legal consequences of the resolution and its implementation.

4. Increasingly, the role and significance of preventive measures by constitutional courts in regard to settling disputes between different authorities concerning power are seen to be more important;

5. The system of constitutional oversight is incomplete and defective until the control of human rights protection has become its inseparable part. All the countries that try to make social development sustainable, that have realized the necessity for building civil societies and the importance of utilizing the creative potential of society strive to reinforce the guarantees for the protection of human rights and freedoms, making it also a subject to constitutional oversight.

Systems of constitutional oversight in Austria, Germany, Italy, France, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, Greece, Romania, Poland, Slovenia, Hungary, Slovakia, Bulgaria, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Georgia, Kirgizistan, Azerbaijan, Moldova, Lithuania, Estonia and Armenia are separately presented in this work.

The main tendencies in the development and further improvement of the system of constitutional oversight in Armenia are revealed on the basis of comparative analysis.

Apart from the books listed in the bibliography, certain studies provided by the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe, have been used, for which I express my gratitude to the Commission.