G. M. Pikis
President of the Supreme Court of Cyprus

The Application of the Principle of Separation of Powers under the Cyprus Constitution

The concept of separation of powers is deeply rooted in the history of law. Aristotle was the first to identify the need for the separation of the powers of the State as a necessary element of a balanced government. Symmetry in this, as in other areas, was perceived by Aristotle as essential for a healthy rule. In such a system of government, it is all important that the judiciary should be identified with the neutrality of the law. In the modern era the principle of separation of powers was taken up by Montesquie in his work on The Spirit of the Law. He singled out the British judiciary as having the attributes of independence notwithstanding the absence of a formal separation of powers. Nowadays few would disagree with the proposition that the institutional separateness of the judiciary is a necessary attribute of its independence.
The application of the principle of separation of powers is the subject of numerous decisions of the Supreme Court of Cyprus. The true application of the principle requires that each power should be institutionally and functionally separated from the others, sovereign and autonomous in its domain; with power to regulate the exercise of its jurisdiction. The three powers of the State should operate co-ordinately that is, each should promote in its sphere the constitutional ends of government. An example of the similarity of the purposes which they should strive to promote, is provided by Article 35 of the Constitution which enjoins each of the three powers of the State, within the limits of their respective competence to ensure the efficient application of human rights.
The doctrine of separation of powers requires each power to confine its actions within the sphere of its jurisdiction. Overstepping this limit casts its deeds outside the law. I discuss, below, the implications of the limitations of the power of each branch of the State beginning with the legislature.

Legislature

The province of the legislature is the making of laws, that is the enactment of abstract and impersonal rules regulating rights and liabilities of the subjects of the law, and making provision for the governance of the country. The legislature must not intrude into the administrative process, the province of the Executive, or bring judgment to bear on any dispute, (the adjudicative process), the sphere of the Judiciary.
The legislature cannot abrogate, vary or amend any order of a department of Government made in the exercise of executive or administrative authority. In Michael Theodosiou Ltd. v. Municipality of Limassol (1993)3 C.L.R. 25, a law annulling orders of acquisition made by the Council of Ministers, was declared unconstitutional. The Court pointed out that the compulsory acquisition of property for public purposes is per se an administrative matter, consequently within the competence of the Executive.
The appointment, termination of services and removal of public officers, including the personnel of public corporations is a function of the Executive. Under the Cyprus Constitution the appointment of public officers and every power associated therewith is trusted to an independent body, the Public Service Commission. A series of laws were declared unconstitutional because provision was made therein bearing directly or indirectly upon the selection of personnel or the termination of their services. Reference will be made to a small number of them, exemplifying the application of the doctrine of separation of powers in this area. In Republic v. Yiallourou (1995)3 C.L.R. 363, and subsequently in Menelaou and Others v. Republic and others (1996)3 C.L.R. 370, and Elias and others v. Republic Cases 534/97 and others - 23.12.1999, the Court held legislation prescribing the conditions for the permanent appointment of temporary personnel to the Public Service, unconstitutional. The power of the Administration to appoint government personnel, includes the entire field of the selection process. This authority cannot be curbed by the legislature, nor the choice of the competent administrative authority be limited. Not only directly but indirectly too the legislature is precluded from stepping into the field of the Administration. In President of the Republic v. House of Representatives (No. 3) (1992)3 C.L.R. 458, the Court was asked to consider the constitutionality of a law initiated by the House of Representatives extending the tenure in office of the Educational Service Commission, the body responsible for the appointment of educationalists. The Court ruled that the law amounted to an act of administration inasmuch as the extension of the services of an administrative organ is an aspect of executive power.
In Pres. of Republic v. House of R/ntatives (1985)3 C.L.R. 1724, it was acknowledged that the House of Representatives may freeze, and in effect prohibit the filling of extant posts in the Public Service. The subject matter of the law was referable to the allocation of resources and control of finances, matters amenable to the power of the legislature. On the other hand the legislature could not make the filling of specific posts subject to the approval of the legislature, which was the theme of the second part of the law duly declared to be unconstitutional.
Addressing administrative needs is a competence of the executive. A classic example of the legislature assuming administrative functions is provided by President of the Republic v. House of Representatives (1992)3 C.L.R. 109. The competent office of government, chose and by order specified an area at the village of Ayios Sozomenos, for the disposal of refuse. A law was enacted thereafter reflecting the opposition of the House of Representatives to the project, prohibiting on pain of penalty, the disposal of refuse at Ayios Sozomenos. The law was declared unconstitutional as the choice of the location for the disposal of refuse was an administrative matter for which responsibility rested with the Executive.
The definition of the field of competence of Ministries and, subject to the Constitution, their powers may be regulated by law. This was affirmed in President of the Republic v. House of Representatives (1985)3 C.L.R. 2779. The nomination, on the other hand, of ministries, again subject to the limitations of the Constitution, is an incident of executive power in the discretion of the President of the Republic. Hence a law purporting to establish ministries according to a division of subject matter of the choice of the House of Representatives, was declared unconstitutional in President of the Republic v. House of Representatives (1985)3 C.L.R. 2801.

The Executive.

Excepting the preparation and submission of bills to the legislature authorised by its Constitution, that may on a strict classification be treated as an incident of legislative power, the Executive is precluded from exercising legislative power save to the extent authorised by law and subject to limitations set thereby. Delegated (secondary, subsidiary) legislation not conforming to the provisions of the empowering enactment, i.e. ultra vires the enabling legislation, is void and may be declared as such by a court of law.
Neither the Council of Ministers, the vestee of the residue of executive power, nor any other organ of Government, can assume or exercise directly or indirectly, any aspect of judicial power. A case illustrating the intrusion of the executive into the judicial domain and the consequences thereto, is the decision of the Supreme Court Kyriakides and Others v. The Republic (1997)3 C.L.R. 485. Following the report of a Commission of Inquiry, set up to investigate allegations of brutality in a department of the police, and acting upon its findings, to the effect that three officers were guilty of abuses amounting to criminal and disciplinary offences, the Council of Ministers ordered their dismissal. The Supreme Court annulled the decision as unconstitutional. The determination of the guilt of any person for the commission of a criminal offence is a judicial matter. Only a court of law can pronounce a person guilty of committing a crime. In the absence of a condemnatory verdict of a court of law, noone can attribute criminal conduct to a person or punish him for that. Likewise no disciplinary sanctions can be imposed, save by the appropriate disciplinary organ in proceedings analogous to judicial proceedings assuring to the respondent the defence rights of the accused in a criminal trial. Consequently the premise of the decision of the Council of Ministers was ill-founded and its action lacked constitutional authority.
With the exception of appointments to the Supreme Court, all other judicial appointments are entrusted to the Supreme Council of Judicature made up of Judges of the Supreme Court. Two laws purporting to confer power upon the Council of Ministers, to make appointments to Courts of specialized jurisdiction were declared unconstitutional. In Keramourgia "AIAS" Ltd v. Yiannakis Christoforou (1975)1 C.L.R. 38, it was held that the involvement of the executive in the appointment and definition of the terms of service of the Chairman of the Industrial Disputes Court, rendered the law unconstitutional and the Court established thereunder ill-constituted, lacking power to assume or exercise judicial functions. In Pastellopoullos v. Republic (1985)2 C.L.R. 165, the relevant provisions of the National Guard Law, providing for the establishment of a Military Court, were likewise found to be unconstitutional because the appointment of the President of the Court was entrusted to the Council of Ministers, and that of its members, to the Commander of the Force. It was emphasised that no Court can be established, constituted or function outside the constitutional framework of the judicial power. Article 30.1 of the Constitution prohibits the establishment of judicial committees or exceptional courts under any name whatsoever.

Separation of Political and Administrative Authorities.

The Constitution distinguishes between political and administrative organs of government. The appointment, promotion, transfer and the exercise of disciplinary control over public officers, is entrusted to the Public Service Commission, an independent body appointed for a six year term. The members of the Commission cannot be removed, except on like grounds and in similar manner as Judges of the Supreme Court. A consistent body of case law establishes that political bodies of Government, should have no involvement in the manning of the Public Service and public corporations. What bodies constitute political departments of Government, was the subject of examination in a good number of cases. In Pavlou v. Returning Officer & Others (1987)1 C.L.R. 252, we adverted to the attributes of political state authorities. Their principle characteristic is that they exercise state power directly at a primary level. Another is that they are politically accountable as opposed to civil servants who are disciplinarily accountable. The Council of Ministers and the House of Representatives are political bodies. In Charilaos Frangoulides (No. 2) and The Republic of Cyprus, through the Public Service Commission (1966)3 C.L.R. 676, a promotion in the Public Service was annulled on the ground that the Minister of Labour took part in the preparation of the confidential reports of employees of his Ministry. The Court noted that the object of the Constitution is to keep all matters pertaining to the competence of the Public Service Commission, appointments, promotions, and transfers, outside the influence of the political side of Government of which the Minister is an important part. In a subsequent decision C.B.C. v. Karayiorgis and Others (1991)3 C.L.R. 159, the Court stressed that Article 28 of the Constitution, establishing inter alia equality before the Administration, justifies the neutrality of political organs of government in matters of appointments and promotions of personnel of public bodies. Equality before the law and the administration requires adherence to norms ruling out political influence in the appointment and promotion of public servants.

The Judiciary

It can be validly argued that the effectiveness of the application of the doctrine of separation of powers, ultimately depends on the establishment and sustenance of an independent judiciary. The institutional independence of the judiciary requires security of tenure and the non-removability of Judges, except upon specified grounds involving conduct incompatible with the office of a Judge, duly established before an independent judicial body. These conditions are satisfied in Cyprus. Judges of the Supreme Court serve until they complete the age of 68, and Judges of lower Courts until they reach the age of 60. A Judge may be removed from office on grounds of misconduct, physical or mental incapacity or infirmity. The removal of a Judge can be sanctioned only by a Council, composed exclusively of Judges of the Supreme Court, in the context of judicial proceedings. The terms of service of Judges cannot be altered to their disadvantage after appointment. Rule making power for every matter associated with recourse to the Court and the transaction of judicial business, is solely and exclusively in the hands of the Supreme Court.
The power to appoint, promote, transfer and discipline Judges of lower Courts, vests in the Supreme Council of Judicature, a body composed of the Judges of the Supreme Court. The power to appoint judges of the Supreme Court belongs to the President of the Republic. In the exercise of this power the President invariably seeks the opinion of the Supreme Court and as a rule acts upon its recommendations. Only on one occasion did the President depart from the recommendation of the Supreme Court and appointed as a Judge of the Supreme Court a Senior Attorney of the Republic. On every other occasion appointments were made from the ranks of the judiciary among Judges recommended by the Supreme Court. Moreover, judges themselves have a solemn duty not only to act independently but to sustain by their conduct, in and outside the Court, the appearance of independence and impartiality. As a rule Judges in Cyprus make no statements to the press and distance themselves from extra judicial causes.
The exercise of disciplinary jurisdiction over members of lower courts has been regulated by Disciplinary Rules in the year 2000 (28.7.2000 - Gazette no. 3423). In the determination of disciplinary liability of a judge all necessary safeguards are assured to the defendant in accordance with the rights of the accused in a criminal trial. A judge found guilty of misconduct is dismissed. The sanction in all other instances for a disciplinary offence is a reprimand and in more serious cases a reprimand published in the official Gazette.
The control of the constitutionality of laws and the review of administrative actions are, of their nature, judicial matters. The Judiciary is the final arbiter of legality. The actions of the judiciary are not like those of the other two powers, subject to any outside control. The reasoning of judicial decisions required by the Constitution (Article 30.2), as a necessary attribute of a valid judgment, is a form of accountability for the exercise of judicial power. The appellate process, absent in the case of the other two powers, is an additional lever of control of judicial action. Judges must take pains to reason explicitly the sphere of their authority. Subject to this, they must be fearless in declaring and applying the law. The words of Lord Atkin in his dissenting opinion in Liversidge v. Anderson (1941)3 All E.R. 338, are a constant reminder of where judicial duty lies. Laws, he proclaimed, speak the same language in war and peace and more importantly still, Judges, he declared, are no respecters of persons. A gratifying addendum are the remarks of Lord Scarman in I.R.C. v. Rossminster Ltd (1980)1 All E.R. 80, 104, referable to the majority judgment in that case "The ghost of Liversidge v. Anderson casts no shadow on this statute and I would think it need no longer haunt the law. It was laid to rest by Lord Radcliffe in Nakkuda Ali v. M. & F Jayaratne (1951) A.C. 66, 75, and no one in this case has sought to revive it, it is now beyond recall."
The supremacy of the law is ultimately dependent on a judiciary devoted to and wholly associated with the law and its transcendent goals. To personify the law is their duty and to do justice to man, their mission. A far seeing judiciary, free from ephemeral tribulations and true to the lasting ends of justice, is a great judiciary.
The interpretation of laws, rules and regulations is exclusively a judicial function. In Diagoras Development v. National Bank of Greece (1985)1 C.L.R. 581, the Court declared unconstitutional a law purporting to define the meaning of pre-existing legislation, with the obvious aim of bypassing a decision of the Court on the same subject. In Papadopoulou and Another v. Rapti and Others (1996)1 C.L.R. 1306, a law making the establishment of a legal right dependent on the certification of facts by the Minister, was pronounced unconstitutional for the reason that the fact finding process for the determination of litigants' rights is a judicial matter. Article 30.2 of the Constitution, establishing the framework of the judicial process, makes the determination of civil rights and obligations the sole responsibility of the judiciary.
I shall not refer to the obvious domain of the judicial power, to determine the rights of the parties in the face of conflict and pronounce on the criminal liability of the subject. I may only note that numerous decisions of the Courts establish beyond doubt, that no authority other than a competent court of law can meet out punishment for infraction of the general law. Punishment of crime and fixing its measure are in the power of the Judiciary. (Republic v. Sampson (1991)1 C.L.R. 858, Demetrakis HajiSavva (1992)1 C.L.R. 1134.).

Резюме

Теория разделения властей имеет глубокие исторические корни. Аристотель первым выдвинул необходимость разделения властей как элемент сбалансированного правления. В дальнейшем эту теорию развил Монтескье. В наши дни вряд ли возможно отрицать, что разделение судебной власти от законодательной и исполнительной властей является необходимым условием для обеспечения ее независимости.

Вопросы применения принципа разделения властей стали предметом некоторых решений Верховного Суда Кипра.

Обсуждение вопроса о разделении властей и в то же время о гарантиях обеспечения их деятельности в рамках своих компетенций автор начал с законодательной власти.

Согласно Конституции, принятие законов является компетенцией законодателя. Законодательная власть не должна вмешиваться в сферу деятельности исполнительной или судебной властей.

По делу (1993) 3 C.L.R 25 Верховный Суд признал неконституционным закон о признании недействительным решения Совета министров о приобретении собственности в общественных целях. Верховный Суд подчеркнул, что приобретение собственности в общественных целях является компетенцией исполнительной власти.

Согласно Конституции Кипра, назначение на должности государственных служащих является компетенцией Комиссии государственной службы. Целая серия законов была признана неконституционной, потому что они прямым или косвенным образом касались назначений на посты или выборов персонала. В некоторых своих решениях Верховный Суд признал неконституционными законы, которые регулировали вопросы назначения временного персонала государственной службы.

Ни Совет министров, ни какой-либо другой орган правления не могут, прямым или косвенным способом брать на себя или выполнять любые функции судебной власти.

Примером такого неправомерного вмешательства может служить дело (1997) 3 C.L.R 485, по которому Совет министров своим решением уволил трех служащих, которых признал виновными в совершении уголовных и административных преступлений. Верховный Суд признал это решение неконституционным, так как только суд может признать человека виновным в совершении преступления и назначить наказание за это. То же самое касается и дисциплинарных санкций, которые должны применяться соответствующими административными органами.

Всех судей, кроме судей Верховного Суда, назначает Верховный совет правосудия.

По делу (1985) 2 C.L.R 165 соответствующие положения закона “О национальной защите”, которые предусматривали создание военного суда, были признаны неконституционными, так как назначение председателя этого суда являлось полномочием Совета министров, а членов этого суда должен был назначить командующий войсками. Верховный Суд заметил, что никакой суд не может создаваться и функционировать вне конституционных рамок судебной системы. Статья 30.1 Конституции запрещает создание судебных комиссий или чрезвычайных судов.

Конституция проводит различие между политическими и административными органами правления. Назначение, освобождение, перевод и контроль за деятельностью государственных служащих осуществляются Комиссией государственной службы. Члены этой Комиссии могут быть освобождены от должности только на тех основаниях, что и судьи Верховного Суда. Политические органы правления не должны вмешиваться в работу государственной службы и государственных учреждений.

Политическими органами правления являются Совет министров и Палата представителей.

Бесспорно, что эффективность применения доктрины разделения властей, в конце концов, зависит от существования независимой судебной власти.

Необходимые условия независимости судебных органов в Кипре гарантируются.

Толкование законов, решений и других нормативных актов является исключительной функцией судебной власти.

В своем решении (1985)1 C.L.R 581 Верховный Суд признал неконституционным закон, который толковал ранее принятый закон, переступая через решение суда по аналогичному вопросу.

Автор замечает, что Верховный Суд принял множество решений, согласно которым никакой другой орган, кроме суда, не уполномочен назначать наказание за совершение преступления, так как это является исключительной компетенцией суда ((1991)1 C.L.R. 858, (1992)1 C.L.R 1134).