G. M. Pikis
President of the Supreme Court of Cyprus
The
Application of the Principle of Separation of Powers under the Cyprus
Constitution
The concept of separation of powers
is deeply rooted in the history of law. Aristotle was the first to identify
the need for the separation of the powers of the State as a necessary
element of a balanced government. Symmetry in this, as in other areas,
was perceived by Aristotle as essential for a healthy rule. In such a
system of government, it is all important that the judiciary should be
identified with the neutrality of the law. In the modern era the principle
of separation of powers was taken up by Montesquie in his work on The
Spirit of the Law. He singled out the British judiciary as having the
attributes of independence notwithstanding the absence of a formal separation
of powers. Nowadays few would disagree with the proposition that the institutional
separateness of the judiciary is a necessary attribute of its independence.
The application of the principle of separation of powers is the subject
of numerous decisions of the Supreme Court of Cyprus. The true application
of the principle requires that each power should be institutionally and
functionally separated from the others, sovereign and autonomous in its
domain; with power to regulate the exercise of its jurisdiction. The three
powers of the State should operate co-ordinately that is, each should
promote in its sphere the constitutional ends of government. An example
of the similarity of the purposes which they should strive to promote,
is provided by Article 35 of the Constitution which enjoins each of the
three powers of the State, within the limits of their respective competence
to ensure the efficient application of human rights.
The doctrine of separation of powers requires each power to confine its
actions within the sphere of its jurisdiction. Overstepping this limit
casts its deeds outside the law. I discuss, below, the implications of
the limitations of the power of each branch of the State beginning with
the legislature.
Legislature
The province of the legislature
is the making of laws, that is the enactment of abstract and impersonal
rules regulating rights and liabilities of the subjects of the law, and
making provision for the governance of the country. The legislature must
not intrude into the administrative process, the province of the Executive,
or bring judgment to bear on any dispute, (the adjudicative process),
the sphere of the Judiciary.
The legislature cannot abrogate, vary or amend any order of a department
of Government made in the exercise of executive or administrative authority.
In Michael Theodosiou Ltd. v. Municipality of Limassol (1993)3 C.L.R.
25, a law annulling orders of acquisition made by the Council of Ministers,
was declared unconstitutional. The Court pointed out that the compulsory
acquisition of property for public purposes is per se an administrative
matter, consequently within the competence of the Executive.
The appointment, termination of services and removal of public officers,
including the personnel of public corporations is a function of the Executive.
Under the Cyprus Constitution the appointment of public officers and every
power associated therewith is trusted to an independent body, the Public
Service Commission. A series of laws were declared unconstitutional because
provision was made therein bearing directly or indirectly upon the selection
of personnel or the termination of their services. Reference will be made
to a small number of them, exemplifying the application of the doctrine
of separation of powers in this area. In Republic v. Yiallourou (1995)3
C.L.R. 363, and subsequently in Menelaou and Others v. Republic and others
(1996)3 C.L.R. 370, and Elias and others v. Republic Cases 534/97 and
others - 23.12.1999, the Court held legislation prescribing the conditions
for the permanent appointment of temporary personnel to the Public Service,
unconstitutional. The power of the Administration to appoint government
personnel, includes the entire field of the selection process. This authority
cannot be curbed by the legislature, nor the choice of the competent administrative
authority be limited. Not only directly but indirectly too the legislature
is precluded from stepping into the field of the Administration. In President
of the Republic v. House of Representatives (No. 3) (1992)3 C.L.R. 458,
the Court was asked to consider the constitutionality of a law initiated
by the House of Representatives extending the tenure in office of the
Educational Service Commission, the body responsible for the appointment
of educationalists. The Court ruled that the law amounted to an act of
administration inasmuch as the extension of the services of an administrative
organ is an aspect of executive power.
In Pres. of Republic v. House of R/ntatives (1985)3 C.L.R. 1724, it was
acknowledged that the House of Representatives may freeze, and in effect
prohibit the filling of extant posts in the Public Service. The subject
matter of the law was referable to the allocation of resources and control
of finances, matters amenable to the power of the legislature. On the
other hand the legislature could not make the filling of specific posts
subject to the approval of the legislature, which was the theme of the
second part of the law duly declared to be unconstitutional.
Addressing administrative needs is a competence of the executive. A classic
example of the legislature assuming administrative functions is provided
by President of the Republic v. House of Representatives (1992)3 C.L.R.
109. The competent office of government, chose and by order specified
an area at the village of Ayios Sozomenos, for the disposal of refuse.
A law was enacted thereafter reflecting the opposition of the House of
Representatives to the project, prohibiting on pain of penalty, the disposal
of refuse at Ayios Sozomenos. The law was declared unconstitutional as
the choice of the location for the disposal of refuse was an administrative
matter for which responsibility rested with the Executive.
The definition of the field of competence of Ministries and, subject to
the Constitution, their powers may be regulated by law. This was affirmed
in President of the Republic v. House of Representatives (1985)3 C.L.R.
2779. The nomination, on the other hand, of ministries, again subject
to the limitations of the Constitution, is an incident of executive power
in the discretion of the President of the Republic. Hence a law purporting
to establish ministries according to a division of subject matter of the
choice of the House of Representatives, was declared unconstitutional
in President of the Republic v. House of Representatives (1985)3 C.L.R.
2801.
The Executive.
Excepting the preparation and
submission of bills to the legislature authorised by its Constitution,
that may on a strict classification be treated as an incident of legislative
power, the Executive is precluded from exercising legislative power save
to the extent authorised by law and subject to limitations set thereby.
Delegated (secondary, subsidiary) legislation not conforming to the provisions
of the empowering enactment, i.e. ultra vires the enabling legislation,
is void and may be declared as such by a court of law.
Neither the Council of Ministers, the vestee of the residue of executive
power, nor any other organ of Government, can assume or exercise directly
or indirectly, any aspect of judicial power. A case illustrating the intrusion
of the executive into the judicial domain and the consequences thereto,
is the decision of the Supreme Court Kyriakides and Others v. The Republic
(1997)3 C.L.R. 485. Following the report of a Commission of Inquiry, set
up to investigate allegations of brutality in a department of the police,
and acting upon its findings, to the effect that three officers were guilty
of abuses amounting to criminal and disciplinary offences, the Council
of Ministers ordered their dismissal. The Supreme Court annulled the decision
as unconstitutional. The determination of the guilt of any person for
the commission of a criminal offence is a judicial matter. Only a court
of law can pronounce a person guilty of committing a crime. In the absence
of a condemnatory verdict of a court of law, noone can attribute criminal
conduct to a person or punish him for that. Likewise no disciplinary sanctions
can be imposed, save by the appropriate disciplinary organ in proceedings
analogous to judicial proceedings assuring to the respondent the defence
rights of the accused in a criminal trial. Consequently the premise of
the decision of the Council of Ministers was ill-founded and its action
lacked constitutional authority.
With the exception of appointments to the Supreme Court, all other judicial
appointments are entrusted to the Supreme Council of Judicature made up
of Judges of the Supreme Court. Two laws purporting to confer power upon
the Council of Ministers, to make appointments to Courts of specialized
jurisdiction were declared unconstitutional. In Keramourgia "AIAS"
Ltd v. Yiannakis Christoforou (1975)1 C.L.R. 38, it was held that the
involvement of the executive in the appointment and definition of the
terms of service of the Chairman of the Industrial Disputes Court, rendered
the law unconstitutional and the Court established thereunder ill-constituted,
lacking power to assume or exercise judicial functions. In Pastellopoullos
v. Republic (1985)2 C.L.R. 165, the relevant provisions of the National
Guard Law, providing for the establishment of a Military Court, were likewise
found to be unconstitutional because the appointment of the President
of the Court was entrusted to the Council of Ministers, and that of its
members, to the Commander of the Force. It was emphasised that no Court
can be established, constituted or function outside the constitutional
framework of the judicial power. Article 30.1 of the Constitution prohibits
the establishment of judicial committees or exceptional courts under any
name whatsoever.
Separation of Political and
Administrative Authorities.
The Constitution distinguishes
between political and administrative organs of government. The appointment,
promotion, transfer and the exercise of disciplinary control over public
officers, is entrusted to the Public Service Commission, an independent
body appointed for a six year term. The members of the Commission cannot
be removed, except on like grounds and in similar manner as Judges of
the Supreme Court. A consistent body of case law establishes that political
bodies of Government, should have no involvement in the manning of the
Public Service and public corporations. What bodies constitute political
departments of Government, was the subject of examination in a good number
of cases. In Pavlou v. Returning Officer & Others (1987)1 C.L.R. 252,
we adverted to the attributes of political state authorities. Their principle
characteristic is that they exercise state power directly at a primary
level. Another is that they are politically accountable as opposed to
civil servants who are disciplinarily accountable. The Council of Ministers
and the House of Representatives are political bodies. In Charilaos Frangoulides
(No. 2) and The Republic of Cyprus, through the Public Service Commission
(1966)3 C.L.R. 676, a promotion in the Public Service was annulled on
the ground that the Minister of Labour took part in the preparation of
the confidential reports of employees of his Ministry. The Court noted
that the object of the Constitution is to keep all matters pertaining
to the competence of the Public Service Commission, appointments, promotions,
and transfers, outside the influence of the political side of Government
of which the Minister is an important part. In a subsequent decision C.B.C.
v. Karayiorgis and Others (1991)3 C.L.R. 159, the Court stressed that
Article 28 of the Constitution, establishing inter alia equality before
the Administration, justifies the neutrality of political organs of government
in matters of appointments and promotions of personnel of public bodies.
Equality before the law and the administration requires adherence to norms
ruling out political influence in the appointment and promotion of public
servants.
The Judiciary
It can be validly argued that
the effectiveness of the application of the doctrine of separation of
powers, ultimately depends on the establishment and sustenance of an independent
judiciary. The institutional independence of the judiciary requires security
of tenure and the non-removability of Judges, except upon specified grounds
involving conduct incompatible with the office of a Judge, duly established
before an independent judicial body. These conditions are satisfied in
Cyprus. Judges of the Supreme Court serve until they complete the age
of 68, and Judges of lower Courts until they reach the age of 60. A Judge
may be removed from office on grounds of misconduct, physical or mental
incapacity or infirmity. The removal of a Judge can be sanctioned only
by a Council, composed exclusively of Judges of the Supreme Court, in
the context of judicial proceedings. The terms of service of Judges cannot
be altered to their disadvantage after appointment. Rule making power
for every matter associated with recourse to the Court and the transaction
of judicial business, is solely and exclusively in the hands of the Supreme
Court.
The power to appoint, promote, transfer and discipline Judges of lower
Courts, vests in the Supreme Council of Judicature, a body composed of
the Judges of the Supreme Court. The power to appoint judges of the Supreme
Court belongs to the President of the Republic. In the exercise of this
power the President invariably seeks the opinion of the Supreme Court
and as a rule acts upon its recommendations. Only on one occasion did
the President depart from the recommendation of the Supreme Court and
appointed as a Judge of the Supreme Court a Senior Attorney of the Republic.
On every other occasion appointments were made from the ranks of the judiciary
among Judges recommended by the Supreme Court. Moreover, judges themselves
have a solemn duty not only to act independently but to sustain by their
conduct, in and outside the Court, the appearance of independence and
impartiality. As a rule Judges in Cyprus make no statements to the press
and distance themselves from extra judicial causes.
The exercise of disciplinary jurisdiction over members of lower courts
has been regulated by Disciplinary Rules in the year 2000 (28.7.2000 -
Gazette no. 3423). In the determination of disciplinary liability of a
judge all necessary safeguards are assured to the defendant in accordance
with the rights of the accused in a criminal trial. A judge found guilty
of misconduct is dismissed. The sanction in all other instances for a
disciplinary offence is a reprimand and in more serious cases a reprimand
published in the official Gazette.
The control of the constitutionality of laws and the review of administrative
actions are, of their nature, judicial matters. The Judiciary is the final
arbiter of legality. The actions of the judiciary are not like those of
the other two powers, subject to any outside control. The reasoning of
judicial decisions required by the Constitution (Article 30.2), as a necessary
attribute of a valid judgment, is a form of accountability for the exercise
of judicial power. The appellate process, absent in the case of the other
two powers, is an additional lever of control of judicial action. Judges
must take pains to reason explicitly the sphere of their authority. Subject
to this, they must be fearless in declaring and applying the law. The
words of Lord Atkin in his dissenting opinion in Liversidge v. Anderson
(1941)3 All E.R. 338, are a constant reminder of where judicial duty lies.
Laws, he proclaimed, speak the same language in war and peace and more
importantly still, Judges, he declared, are no respecters of persons.
A gratifying addendum are the remarks of Lord Scarman in I.R.C. v. Rossminster
Ltd (1980)1 All E.R. 80, 104, referable to the majority judgment in that
case "The ghost of Liversidge v. Anderson casts no shadow on this
statute and I would think it need no longer haunt the law. It was laid
to rest by Lord Radcliffe in Nakkuda Ali v. M. & F Jayaratne (1951)
A.C. 66, 75, and no one in this case has sought to revive it, it is now
beyond recall."
The supremacy of the law is ultimately dependent on a judiciary devoted
to and wholly associated with the law and its transcendent goals. To personify
the law is their duty and to do justice to man, their mission. A far seeing
judiciary, free from ephemeral tribulations and true to the lasting ends
of justice, is a great judiciary.
The interpretation of laws, rules and regulations is exclusively a judicial
function. In Diagoras Development v. National Bank of Greece (1985)1 C.L.R.
581, the Court declared unconstitutional a law purporting to define the
meaning of pre-existing legislation, with the obvious aim of bypassing
a decision of the Court on the same subject. In Papadopoulou and Another
v. Rapti and Others (1996)1 C.L.R. 1306, a law making the establishment
of a legal right dependent on the certification of facts by the Minister,
was pronounced unconstitutional for the reason that the fact finding process
for the determination of litigants' rights is a judicial matter. Article
30.2 of the Constitution, establishing the framework of the judicial process,
makes the determination of civil rights and obligations the sole responsibility
of the judiciary.
I shall not refer to the obvious domain of the judicial power, to determine
the rights of the parties in the face of conflict and pronounce on the
criminal liability of the subject. I may only note that numerous decisions
of the Courts establish beyond doubt, that no authority other than a competent
court of law can meet out punishment for infraction of the general law.
Punishment of crime and fixing its measure are in the power of the Judiciary.
(Republic v. Sampson (1991)1 C.L.R. 858, Demetrakis HajiSavva (1992)1
C.L.R. 1134.).
Резюме
Теория разделения
властей имеет глубокие исторические корни. Аристотель первым выдвинул
необходимость разделения властей как элемент сбалансированного правления.
В дальнейшем эту теорию развил Монтескье. В наши дни вряд ли возможно
отрицать, что разделение судебной власти от законодательной и исполнительной
властей является необходимым условием для обеспечения ее независимости.
Вопросы применения
принципа разделения властей стали предметом некоторых решений Верховного
Суда Кипра.
Обсуждение вопроса
о разделении властей и в то же время о гарантиях обеспечения их деятельности
в рамках своих компетенций автор начал с законодательной власти.
Согласно Конституции,
принятие законов является компетенцией законодателя. Законодательная власть
не должна вмешиваться в сферу деятельности исполнительной или судебной
властей.
По делу (1993) 3
C.L.R 25 Верховный Суд признал неконституционным закон о признании
недействительным решения Совета министров о приобретении собственности
в общественных целях. Верховный Суд подчеркнул, что приобретение собственности
в общественных целях является компетенцией исполнительной власти.
Согласно Конституции
Кипра, назначение на должности государственных служащих является компетенцией
Комиссии государственной службы. Целая серия законов была признана неконституционной,
потому что они прямым или косвенным образом касались назначений на посты
или выборов персонала. В некоторых своих решениях Верховный Суд признал
неконституционными законы, которые регулировали вопросы назначения временного
персонала государственной службы.
Ни Совет министров,
ни какой-либо другой орган правления не могут, прямым или косвенным способом
брать на себя или выполнять любые функции судебной власти.
Примером такого неправомерного
вмешательства может служить дело (1997) 3 C.L.R 485, по которому
Совет министров своим решением уволил трех служащих, которых признал виновными
в совершении уголовных и административных преступлений. Верховный Суд
признал это решение неконституционным, так как только суд может признать
человека виновным в совершении преступления и назначить наказание за это.
То же самое касается и дисциплинарных санкций, которые должны применяться
соответствующими административными органами.
Всех судей, кроме
судей Верховного Суда, назначает Верховный совет правосудия.
По делу (1985) 2
C.L.R 165 соответствующие положения закона “О национальной защите”,
которые предусматривали создание военного суда, были признаны неконституционными,
так как назначение председателя этого суда являлось полномочием Совета
министров, а членов этого суда должен был назначить командующий войсками.
Верховный Суд заметил, что никакой суд не может создаваться и функционировать
вне конституционных рамок судебной системы. Статья 30.1 Конституции запрещает
создание судебных комиссий или чрезвычайных судов.
Конституция проводит
различие между политическими и административными органами правления. Назначение,
освобождение, перевод и контроль за деятельностью государственных служащих
осуществляются Комиссией государственной службы. Члены этой Комиссии могут
быть освобождены от должности только на тех основаниях, что и судьи Верховного
Суда. Политические органы правления не должны вмешиваться в работу государственной
службы и государственных учреждений.
Политическими органами
правления являются Совет министров и Палата представителей.
Бесспорно, что эффективность
применения доктрины разделения властей, в конце концов, зависит от существования
независимой судебной власти.
Необходимые условия
независимости судебных органов в Кипре гарантируются.
Толкование законов,
решений и других нормативных актов является исключительной функцией судебной
власти.
В своем решении (1985)1
C.L.R 581 Верховный Суд признал неконституционным закон, который
толковал ранее принятый закон, переступая через решение суда по аналогичному
вопросу.
Автор замечает, что
Верховный Суд принял множество решений, согласно которым никакой другой
орган, кроме суда, не уполномочен назначать наказание за совершение преступления,
так как это является исключительной компетенцией суда ((1991)1 C.L.R.
858, (1992)1 C.L.R 1134).
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